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OFFICE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

2-5938

For [redacted] Committee
Consideration + Action

AUG 12 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, ICAPS

Subject: Implementation of NSC 50
(Armstrong's 4 Problems)

I have the following comments to make upon the first and third of the four State papers attached to your memorandum of 3 August 1949:

I. Coordination of Intelligence Activities

It is strongly urged that "the coordination of intelligence activities" which is to be the responsibility of ICAPS and the Estimates Division be specifically interpreted to include the procurement of intelligence information abroad as well as the coordination of the research program in Washington. The routine OCD responsibility for coordination and collection of requirements and requests is actually not concerned with the major problem of intelligence procurement abroad—the clear-cut assignment to foreign representatives of the IAC agencies of responsibility for the overt collection of specific non-duplicating categories of information and a concrete clarification of the line between overt and covert intelligence procurement. This lack of clarity is particularly conspicuous in the collection of information on Communist matters, a field in which foreign representatives of all IAC agencies actively collect political and counter-intelligence information. This Office some time ago took appropriate steps to delineate clearly the specifically covert aspects of intelligence procurement on Communism for the briefing of its own representatives abroad, but an efficient and coordinated program of such procurement on both the covert and overt side cannot be established without an overall IAC solution to the problem. It is worth pointing out that in many of the discussions in which members of this Office have participated on the preparation of significant political estimates having to do with Soviet-Communist matters, the major problem was the inadequacy of material available in Washington for drawing up a satisfactory estimate. In many cases it was clear to the analysts involved that the desired information was definitely obtainable through the normal overt facilities available for procurement to this Government abroad.

ADJ. SEC. memo 24 Sept. re this
to [redacted]

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This "coordination" function should certainly also be interpreted to include the interrogation of PW's and escapees from Eastern Europe and the USSR, an activity which, especially in Germany, is becoming a steadily more confused aspect of this Government's foreign intelligence procurement program.

III. Responsibility for Research and Reports

Over the past two years this Office has pointed out the basic inadequacy of the functional research work on Communism being conducted by the IAC agencies, a factor vitally affecting the efficiency and selectivity of this Office's program for the clandestine collection of information on the Communist movement. It is again urged that the functional approach to research and reports work on Communism be considered as a high priority "field of common concern" and that every effort be made to develop as rapidly as possible an adequate staff within the projected Research and Reports Division to handle this program. Several steps have been taken in this direction in both OIR and ORE, but these represent only minor steps in the right direction in the face of the total basic research that must be carried out on the Communist movement before adequate estimates can be drawn up and definitely before precise and informed direction can be given to the procurement of additional information by this Office and by the IAC agencies responsible for overt collection.

It is also pertinent to point out that the present capabilities of the IAC agencies for performing basic research work on the USSR are extremely limited and that, whether or not this program be defined as a "field of common concern", ICAPS, together with the Research and Reports Division, should make every effort at the earliest possible time to broaden these capabilities. This inadequacy is presently affecting the progress of this Office's program for the analysis of operational intelligence on the USSR and will necessarily have an adverse effect on the clandestine procurement of intelligence information from within the USSR. The setting up of specific intelligence requirements within the USSR cannot be as precise as it should be without more thorough basic analysis of the information already available.

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Assistant Director